

The University of Chicago

THE SOCIAL ECONOMY OF THE
TLINGIT INDIANS

A PART OF A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES IN CANDIDACY FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF ANTHROPOLOGY

1937

By

KALERVO OBERG

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CONCLUSION

Interest in primitive economics is as old as the science of economics itself. Most early economists, including Adam Smith, were aware of the fact that economic systems varied tremendously in material equipment and organization, both historically and in the world of their time. The recognition of these differences led to the formulation of a hypothesis known as the Theory of the Three Stages. The primal stage of society, this theory stated, was one resting upon hunting and fishing. There were higher types of society resting upon pastoral economy, and finally, societies based upon agriculture.

The essential elements of this theory appear to be, (1) a classification of economies in terms of systems of technology, (2) the acceptance of historical development, (3) such valuative concepts as lower and higher, primal and advanced. The Theory of the Three Stages never developed far beyond the bare statement of its principles. With the rise of the evolutionary hypothesis, the influence of this theory waned. In the middle of the last century, however, Friedrich List¹ made an effort to popularize it among economists. More recently, Pater Koppers² has given it an important place in his studies of primitive economies.

In conclusion we might say that the Theory of the Three Stages of economic development was the first uncritical attempt to bring order into the observed facts about the economic life of primitive peoples. The generalizations reached were but approximations of a classificatory nature built upon the basis of scanty and untested field material. Yet, in its way, this theory stimulated men towards further investigation and paved the way towards the statement of more critical generalizations.

With the advent of the Evolutionary Theory, the three stages of savagery, pastoralism, and agriculture became accepted

¹Friedrich List, 1840, Nationales System der Politischen Ökonomie (Stuttgart und Tübingen).

²Pater Koppers, 1915-16, "Die Ethnologische Wirtschaftsforschung," Anthropos, X, 611-51; XI, 971-1079.

as predetermined, necessary halting places in the evolution of society. Every society, it was believed, has gone or will go through these three stages in the order stated. During the latter half of the nineteenth century, this theory was widely accepted, and it is still retained by a number of recent writers on economics, as F. A. Walker¹ and Charles Gide.²

The essential difference between the older theory of the three stages and the evolutionary theory seems to lie in the fact that the older theory stipulated nothing as to origins and progression. It was a cardinal principle of the evolutionary theory, however, that the three stages were historically connected and that one stage developed out of the other. This crude formulation of the evolution of economic systems did not go long unchallenged. It was pointed out at a very early date that in many parts of the world, notably in the South Seas, where agriculture was practiced the absence of large mammals made it impossible for the inhabitants of these regions ever to have led a pastoral existence. Moreover, it was pointed out that the three stages were an over simplification of observed facts, that there were wider variations in the forms of hunting, pastoral, and agricultural economies, which required further classification. These obvious defects of the theory of the three stages, both in its earlier and in its evolutionary form, led to its general abandonment. The principle of evolution, however, was retained and gave rise to a variety of new theories in which the problem of origins became of primary importance.

During the latter half of the nineteenth century knowledge about primitive cultures increased in volume and accuracy. Writers began to deal with particular primitive economies rather than with the economic life of primitive man in general. The three stages, for instance, were further subdivided, and we find Lewis Morgan³ writing about two stages of savagery and three of barbarism. Classifications along lines other than technology

¹F. A. Walker, 1887, Political Economy (2d ed., New York).

²Charles Gide, 1906, Principes d'Economie Politique (Paris).

³Lewis Morgan, 1877, Ancient Society (New York).

came into prominence. Bruno Hildebrand¹ distinguished a period of barter, a period of money, and a period of credit. Ratzel² was able to depict a wide range of economic adjustments due to variations in physical environment.

Agricultural economies, writers observed, originated from different sources. Waitz³ and Bachofen⁴ maintained that agriculture was a direct descendant of the hunting stage of early society. Nowacki,⁵ on the other hand, gave evidence to prove that pastoralism and agriculture had both originated from a primal stage of collecting and hunting. Ling Roth⁶ regarded agriculture as originating in the collecting stage and as a result of the work of women.

A more elaborate theory of the origin of agriculture was presented towards the end of the last century by Eduard Hahn.⁷ Perhaps of lasting value is his distinction between hoe or garden culture, on the one hand, and true agriculture characterized by the use of the plow and the presence of domesticated cattle, on the other. Hoe culture, Hahn claimed, grew naturally out of a collecting stage of economy. True agriculture, he stated, originated in Babylonia and under the specific conditions provided by the rights pertaining to the worship of the moon goddess. The use of cattle as draught animals once accomplished, it was a simple matter to transfer their use to economic purposes. Hahn goes even further and states that pastoralism developed from true agriculture as it first appeared in Babylonia, thus completely reversing the generally accepted order of development. Hahn was, perhaps, the first to suggest a non-technical origin to agriculture.

¹Bruno Hildebrand, 1848, Die Nationalökonomie der Gegenwart und Zukunft (Frankfurt a. Maine).

²Friedrich Ratzel, 1898, The History of Mankind, translated from German by A. J. Butler (London).

³T. Waitz, 1859, Anthropologie der Naturvölker (Leipzig).

⁴J. J. Bachofen, 1861, Das Mutterrecht (Stuttgart).

⁵A. Nowacki, 1879, Über die Entwicklung der Landwirtschaft in der Urzeit (Berlin).

⁶Ling Roth, 1887, "On the Origin of Agriculture," Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, XVI, 102-30.

⁷Eduard Hahn, 1914, Von der Hacke zum Pflug (Leipzig).

The primary interest of earlier economists had been with techniques of production, with hunting, collecting, fishing, pastoral, and agricultural types of economy. Investigation had centered about the problem of the origin of one type out of another. Hildebrand had made an attempt to set up stages of barter, money, and credit, thereby, perhaps for the first time, throwing light on the problem of distribution and exchange in primitive cultures. The sphere of economics known as property or ownership had as yet received little attention. I do not know who first propounded the doctrine of primitive communism, but in the latter half of the nineteenth century it became a widely accepted belief. We find it in the works of Morgan,¹ Maine,² and, later, in the works of Rivers,³ all of whom purported to have derived it from inductive inquiry. It was held by Marx, Engels, and numerous other social writers, not as an inductive principle, however, but as an article of faith.

This theory stated that primitive economies were characterized by common ownership of the means of production, such as resources and tools, and by a sharing of the communally produced product. The fact that some primitive peoples had systems of private ownership was explained by their being on a higher level of social development. The communistic idea fell in very well with the evolutionary hypothesis which saw development from the simple and undifferentiated to the complex and differentiated. Like the belief in an original stage of sexual promiscuity, the postulation of a stage of communism was rather a necessity of theoretical thinking than a result of inductive investigation.

One of the first writers on primitive economics to discard the doctrine of unilinear evolution was Ernst Grosse (1896).⁴ It was his belief that the varying types of economy were the result of varying environmental conditions. He postulated a drive of economic activity which he considered constant. Variation in the form of economic organization was due to the working out of

¹Morgan, 1877, op. cit.

²Henry Maine, 1871, Village Communities in the East and West (London).

³W. H. R. Rivers, 1924, Social Organization (London).

⁴Ernst Grosse, 1896, Die Formen der Familie und die Formen der Wirtschaft (Freiburg und Leipzig).

this drive under varying local conditions. Grosse divides primitive economies into lower and higher hunters, pastoralists, and lower and higher agriculturalists. These forms he did not consider as stages in an evolutionary series but rather as different ways of adjusting to physical environment. Furthermore, Grosse held that the form of production was the primary determinant of social relationships in any culture. Basing his generalizations upon the facts of certain West Asiatic tribes, he claimed that the type of economic production determines the form of the family, the forms of government, law, and religion. The form of social relationships, in turn, condition the individual character of the inhabitants of any area.

The works of Huntington,¹ Semple,² and Griffith Taylor³ fall within the scope of the environmental approach, but as these writers deal with culture and history as wholes rather than with primitive economics their works have general rather than particular reference to the study of primitive economics. The same is true of Arnold Toynbee's⁴ A Study of History. In its broadest aspects, as Toynbee points out, culture is the result of the interaction of man and nature. He studies this relationship as a stimulus response phenomenon, and endeavors to show the total effect of environment, not only on the economy, but on the religion and art of a given culture. Important to him is the intensity of the stimulus provided by nature. He claims that the Norse Culture of Iceland developed to its highest extent in Iceland because Iceland provided a stronger stimulus than Norway, the home of the Icelandic immigrants, and that this cultural development failed to take place in Greenland where the stimulus provided by nature was too severe.

In strict opposition to Grosse and his environmental theory was Alfred Vierkandt⁵ who maintained that the fundamental

¹Ellsworth Huntington, 1924, Civilization and Climate (3d ed., New Haven).

²Ellen C. Semple, 1911, Influences of Geographic Environment (London).

³Thomas Griffith Taylor, 1927, Environment and Race (London).

⁴Arnold Toynbee, 1932, A Study of History (London).

⁵Alfred Vierkandt, 1899, "Die Wirtschaftliche Verhältnisse der Naturvölker," Zeitschrift für Socialwissenschaft (Berlin, Vol. II).

determinant of culture was the psychological nature of man. In addition, he objected to a classification of cultures on the basis of economy, because, he claimed, culture was not proportionate to economic development. He based human activities upon instincts; he claimed that hunting, for instance, was due to a hunting instinct which formed a part of the psychological endowment of primitive people. The development of an industrial technique was due to an inventive instinct in modern man. In analyzing the processes of invention and discovery, Vierkendt added considerably to our understanding of economic development. He conclusively showed that inventions of the simplest kind were due to a long process of preliminary development capped by the work of some individual who claimed the discovery as his own.

On the basis of psychological characteristics, Vierkant divided cultures into six grades. The highest alone, that of the Full Culture, is characterized by the existence of free personality and individual expression. The remaining grades are marked by varying degrees of constraint of individual expression, the individual being subjected to the authority of the whole community. Of these people there are four principal types, the Roving Peoples, the True Nature Folk, the Nomadic Semi-Cultured Peoples, and the Settled Semi-Cultured Peoples. Due to European contact there are a number of mixed cultures distinguished from the purer types.

The historical school of economists was interested in the development of modern economic institutions and went into the early history of Europe for their material. Among them the foremost were: Knies, Roscher, Marx, Schmoller, Jones, Veblen, Bücher, Müller-Lyer, and Max Weber. Of these men only Bücher,¹ Müller-Lyer,² and Max Weber³ will concern us here, for they, alone, discussed the economics of simpler societies.

The form of any type of economic organization, this school

¹Karl Bücher, 1893, Die Entstehung der Volkswirtschaft (Tübingen) (English translation: Industrial Evolution, translated by Morley S. Wickett [New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1901]).

²E. Müller-Lyer, 1920, History of Social Development (Phasen der Kultur), translated by Elizabeth Coote Lake and A. H. Lake (London).

³Max Weber, 1923, General Economic History, translated by Frank H. Knight, 1927 (New York).

believed, was understandable only in terms of its past history. Karl Bücher posits a pre-economic stage of primitive individual search for food. This was followed by a stage of gift giving which later developed into exchange. Primitive man, he believed, had no forethought, no conception of economic values and organization. Primitive populations, he thought, were kept down by infanticide. The search for food was in the nature of play and later developed into work. Bücher's stages of the economic development of Europe, however, are of greater value. He divided this development into five levels: (1) House Work (domestic system), (2) Wage Work, (3) Handicrafts, (4) Commission Work (house industry), (5) Factory System.

While Bücher saw work developing from play, and exchange out of gift giving, another writer, Müller-Lyer, saw exchange as having developed out of silent trade which, in turn, had developed out of robbery.

Max Weber, on the other hand, tended to see economic development as a function of social organization and religion. The division of labor between men and women led to agriculture as women's work. The men's house gave handicrafts an opportunity to develop. An individualistic morality and religion coupled with a rational, stable political system provided a field for the development of capitalism.

In their economic studies the diffusionists concentrated their attention on the centers of origin and the resultant spread of technological implements and economic processes. The mapping of the distribution of certain types of dwellings, bows, and wearing apparel was considered more important than the understanding of the organization of any special system of economy. Pater Koppers,¹ perhaps, did more in this field than any of his co-diffusionists. He gave economy a central place in the development of social institutions, but protected himself from being called a materialist by claiming that religion was on a different level from economy. Koppers related economic systems to social organization and postulated three levels of primitive culture; (1) Exogamic Patriarchal, (2) Exogamic Matriarchal, (3) Patriarchal with strongly developed family. Elements from one level and area infringe upon another and result in culture development.

¹Pater Koppers, op. cit.

Sociological and functional theories of economics are presented in the works of such well-known writers as Durkheim, Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown, Firth, and Hobhouse.

As early as 1902, Emile Durkheim in his work, De la division du travail social, set forth a sociological theory of economies. Economy formed an integral part of the social structure of any culture and varied in form with it. Taking the division of labor as the sociological counterpart of technical and regional specialization, and treating it as a variable, Durkheim correlated its variations with other social phenomena, such as (1) Industrial Behavior, (2) Law and Morals, (3) Solidarity, (4) Political Regime, (5) Economic Organization, (6) Religion and Ideology. With the lack of or a slight division of labor, individual behavior is dominated by the group to which the individual belongs in such a way as to make all behavior nearly alike. There is repression in law and morals--sanctions being sacred--there is mechanical solidarity, undifferentiated group action in politics, communal property, impersonal totemic forces in religion in keeping with an undifferentiated society. With an increase in the division of labor, mental and moral similarity in the individual tends to disappear, conduct is prescribed in a less extensive field of activity, solidarity becomes organic due to increasing independence of individuals, specialization of political functions, private property, contractual co-operation, and polytheism and monotheism in religion.

Malinowski's theoretical approach to economics is well summarized in the following quotation:

To sum up briefly, it is incorrect to assume that man for a long time has lived in a semi-natural primitive stage of undivided acquisition of food and primary utilities. Equally untrue is the correlated assumption that he lifted himself out of this condition by the gradual application of the economic principle of maximum of effect for the minimum of effort. Instead, from the very outset, artificial, cultural, non-institutive aims have been indispensable to him and his culture. This effort is organized and standardized by tradition. The real problem, therefore, consists in gaining insight into the primitive forms of condensed wealth, into the mixture of motives and impulses which drive man; and in studying the manner in which the primitive incentives control organized effective effort. All the conclusions arrived at show that for the discussion of economic problems it is necessary to consider the relation of early wealth to religion and to magic as well as its function in primitive social structure. The borderland question--the influence of econo-

mics on social structure; the problem of wealth as the foundation of rank, power and status; the rule of give-and-take in social obligations, ceremonial distribution of goods and its economic importance--are gradually coming into the forefront of anthropological interest, and open up entirely new horizons in the theory of observances.¹

This is the approach which Malinowski has used throughout his early writings and is the method which he still uses with slight modifications.

Radcliffe-Brown in his description of the economy of the Andaman Islanders follows the functional method in so far as he correlates economic processes with technology, on the one hand, and with social structure, on the other.²

Raymond Firth, in his study of the economy of the New Zealand Maori, follows very closely the functional approach as developed by Malinowski. He, like Malinowski, views the economic side of life as a complex set of activities, rooted ultimately in the instinctive needs characteristic of every human animal, but molded according to the organization and incentives, traditional rules, and religious beliefs current in any society. Within this economic framework, each implement, each activity, each feature of organization has its place and can be understood fully only in relation to this milieu.³

Thurnwald⁴ classifies economic systems on the basis of technology and social structure into nine types, for example, Homogeneous Hunters and Herdsmen; Ethnically Stratified Cattle Breeders and Traders.

He discusses economic activities under headings, like handicrafts, trade, slavery, symbols of value, and money. The method of analysis is functional but Thurnwald, like Radcliffe-Brown, differs from Malinowski and Firth in that he follows up

¹Bronislaw Malinowski, "Anthropology," Encyclopedia Britannica, 13th ed., 1926.

²A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, 1922, The Andaman Islanders (Cambridge).

³Raymond Firth, 1929, Primitive Economics of the New Zealand Maori (New York); Bronislaw Malinowski, 1921, "Primitive Economics of the Trobriand Islanders," Economic Journal, XXXI, 1-16; Malinowski, 1922, Argonauts of the Western Pacific (London); Malinowski, 1935, Coral Gardens (London).

⁴Richard Thurnwald, 1932, Economics in Primitive Communities (London: International Institute of African Languages and Cultures).

his functional analysis by a search for more general principles through comparison.

Presented thus, side by side, these various theories pertaining to the economic life of primitive people give an impression of confusion and mutual contradiction. Investigators disagreed, not only as to their subject matter, but in the problems posed and the conclusions arrived at. A number of writers held the economic relations of primitive peoples to be based on communism; Bücher saw these relations as centered in pure individualism. Most evolutionists believed that agriculture succeeded pastoralism. Otto Hahn, on the other hand, believed that, in the Near East at least, pastoralism arose out of the domestication of cattle and their use in plow-culture. Further, Bücher saw exchange growing out of the gift exchange, while Müller-Lyer believed that economic exchanges developed into the exchange of gifts. Malinowski disputed the existence of the economic principle and saw economic transactions as harmonious, balanced relations based on the principle of reciprocity.

It is only when we view these theories and points of view as stages in the development of the science of primitive economics that, to some extent at least, a semblance of order appears. Early writers seized upon the facts most available. There was no body of facts dealing with primitive economic life as a whole. The most obvious facts of primitive life were elements of material culture, tools and processes of production. These facts accumulated through travellers' tales and were eventually made available to social theorists. It is, therefore, no particular mystery why the focus of attention was first directed towards technology. Preoccupation with material culture gave rise to such theories as the scheme of the three stages. This interest dominates most of the evolutionary theories and forms a large portion of the subject matter for the building of historical sequences and the culture areas of the diffusionists.

The next phase or category of primitive economies to receive attention was that of ownership or property. Whether Morgan with his hypothesis of an original stage of primitive communism is correct as against Bücher and his statement of primitive individualism, does not concern us here. What is interesting, however, is that the property aspect of economics was systematically approached. Discarding the controversy of which

came first, we now know that the elements of common ownership and individual ownership exist in primitive economies, often side by side. Interest, controversy, and investigation has eventually led to a harmonizing of conflicting points of view.

Perhaps, to Bruno Hildebrand goes the honor of first approaching that important aspect of primitive economics known as distribution and exchange. By outlining the stages of barter, money, and credit, he did little more than pose the problem. Since then writers have expanded this aspect of economics with studies on primitive trade, money, the gift exchange, and various forms of sharing.

The field of consumption has been the last to receive attention from the students of primitive economics, and it seems that Malinowski was the first to lay stress on the necessity for discovering the functions of wealth in primitive communities. Here, again, one may disagree with Malinowski's conceptions, but what he has done will lead to further researches and formulations of problems. The works of Firth and Richards have brought material and interest to this field, but it can scarcely be said that they have added anything to the formulations of their teacher, Malinowski.

The study of primitive economies developed, therefore, by a gradual extension of the subject matter under investigation. It is curious to note that it paralleled the development of economic science as applied to our own culture, but came some half century later. Adam Smith's emphasis on production dominated the science of economics until Ricardo succeeded in forcing attention upon the field of distribution early in the nineteenth century. Finally, the development of a psychological theory of consumption by the Austrian school led to a criticism of the psychological theory, and a further advance was made in the study of consumption by the modern economists. Thus, we can say that all aspects of economic life, both in primitive and advanced societies are today under consideration. One might add here, that the categories of economic thought, namely, production, distribution, and consumption have stood the test of time and serve today, as formerly, by being convenient headings under which to organize observed facts about economic life.

Along with the extension of the scope of economics, as applied to primitive cultures, went a development of theoretical

interest, and, as usual, classification formed the initial approach to the subject matter. The theory of the three stages is not much more than recognition of the fact that economic systems differ, and that they can be classified on the basis of their technological systems into hunting, pastoral, and agricultural economies. The theory has as a corollary a classification according to complexity; pastoral economies being classed as simpler than agricultural economies, and hunting economies as simpler than pastoral economies.

The numerous evolutionary theories not only maintained the older classifications but sought new ones or made sub-classifications within the wider classes. However, the evolutionists had other problems than the building of classifications. In fact, we might say that the center of their interest was the search for connecting links between different types of economic organization, for the formulation of theories as to how different types were connected in time. Along with a recognition of diversity, went a recognition of variation in complexity and the postulation of a historical order from simple to complex. In this scheme the search for origins and sequence became of paramount importance.

The recognition and classification of differences and the attempt to see these differences in an ordered chronological sequence was followed by theories pertaining to explain observed differences through the working out of certain determining factors. Environmental determinism as developed by Ratzel and Grosse went far towards showing the conditioning power of physical environment upon systems of economy. This line of investigation and theory has not yet been exhausted and will continue to play a part in the study of cultural variation.

As a second line of attack upon differentiation, we had the development of psychological theories of determinism. In so far as these theories, as, for example, that developed by Vierkandt, founded their principles upon variations in instincts, they have today been largely discredited. There is no evidence today to support the view that hunting cultures are based upon a hunting instinct. A certain psychological bent is apparent among hunting peoples, but this bent cannot be taken as a cause, but rather as something derived from an occupation involving hunting. If a psychological theory is so worded that it postulates

universal individual drives or conditions of existence which must be fulfilled, some room can be given to it in the equipment of research. It is, of course, true that neither in environment nor in mind can we seek for cultural variations, but in the relationship between the two.

A third line of approach, this time more specifically upon the similarities evident in different economic systems, was provided by assuming historical connection. Different theories about similarities and differences in economic systems assumed the invention of certain characteristics in a few centers from which these so-called traits later spread to other regions. Borrowing became a way of explaining the presence of specific and even generic similarities, as independent invention became a way of explaining the origin of differences. Within limitation the explanation of similarities in tools and technical processes through historical contact goes far toward throwing light upon the presence of similar elements in contiguous areas. When direct historical evidence can support this contact, the explanation is conclusive. On the other hand, borrowing does not explain the original invention of a bit of material culture nor of a special technical process. Moreover, it would appear that the conditions which led to the discovery and invention of a particular element of an economic organization would also have existed in the culture taking over the trait. In other words, when direct historical evidence is not available, it cannot be definitely accepted that a trait was borrowed, for the conditions for its acceptance existed in both the supposed center of diffusion and at the periphery from where it was supposed to have diffused.

The evolutionary hypothesis set down as one of its cardinal principles that the potentialities for differentiation exist within the social situation--the relationship between man and nature and between man and man. The efforts of students to ascertain these potentialities led to statements of environmental, psychological, and historical determinism. All three of these theories endeavored to find the causal forces outside of the cultural situation, either in environment, in individual mind or body, or in some neighboring culture. The exhaustion of these one-sided approaches led to a re-examination of the cultural situation itself.

The first step in this direction led to more complete

analysis of economic systems as integral parts of cultures as going concerns. Before we know why economic systems differ and how they change, we must know what they are. To Malinowski, more, perhaps, than to any other man, do we owe the beginnings of this type of cultural analysis. Economic activity has its source in the biological organism of man. To satisfy his primary needs for food, shelter, and clothing, man has developed a complex system of instrumental devices ranging from material equipment, systems of co-operation, codes of law, values and ideals to magic and religion. Economic activity is intimately connected in primitive societies with magic and religion, with taboo and sacrifice. All these interconnections, Malinowski believes, must be fully realized and described if we are to understand that complex system known as the economy of a given people. Malinowski is not interested in different types of economy, but in economic systems in general. If there is any hint of determinism in his theoretical approach, it is of a biological nature. Cultures, and along with them systems of economy, are born out of the biological needs of man. This type of determinism, of course, has nothing to say about variation, but, in subjecting a given cultural situation to examination, it prepares the ground for a more efficient search for the forces that govern social variation. Functional correlation when applied to economics seeks to define the purposive content and inter-relations between economic institutions. A group engaged in production is often a kinship group--a family or an extended family. Property is often owned by such groups in common or is held in trust by a chief. A leading magician or religious head may participate in the rites of the first fruits or otherwise take part in productive activities. The gift may be the principal method by which wealth flows from one individual or group to another. Wealth, moreover, is used for purposes other than the satisfaction of economic wants. Ceremonial, religious, or military display and individual desire for power and prestige often lead to the utilization of vast quantities of wealth influencing the productive and distributive processes.

Another type of functional analysis which has a widespread hold on anthropological thinking is that represented by the work of Radcliffe-Brown. Like Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown insists that a coherent, synchronic description of a culture is necessary before we can proceed to other types of study.

Radcliffe-Brown, however, insists that mere description is not sufficient, but that one should seek to reduce the complexity of social phenomena to the underlying principles that govern form and to the special social mechanisms that maintain a given form. The search for structural principles, or, for that matter, principles of any type, is certainly an advance on mere description. When through comparison more general principles are sought, we are well under way towards the establishment of scientific generalizations. This comparison may be synchronic as is the work of Thurnwald in his studies of primitive economies, or it may be diachronic as is the work completed earlier in the century by Durkheim.

The present work on the economy of the Tlingit Indians shows the influence of the ideas and methods promulgated by the functional school, particularly of Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown. The first object was to get as clear and as well rounded an account as possible of the traditional form of economy. Some difficulty was involved in this because many of the social customs had broken down and had to be reconstructed on the basis of the memory of the old men and women. An attempt was made to adhere more rigorously to the economic categories of production, distribution, and consumption than is generally practiced by students using the functional method. Many economists accuse Malinowski of overcomplicating his description, of clouding up useful economic concepts through overabundant descriptive correlations that bear little or no relation to underlying economic forces. In an effort to overcome these difficulties, I included under the categorical headings only material that rightly belonged there. It is true that the economic system is an integral part of social structure, that magic and religious ceremonial enter into its operation, but one must constantly be on one's guard that only that much of social structure is described under production which enters vitally into the organization of labor. Kinship avoidances among the Tlingit had little or no bearing upon the co-operative effort so that their description must come elsewhere than in a discussion of labor. Similarly, fishing and hunting magic alone needs description in connection with the study of the economic pursuits of fishing and hunting. While an economic system fits into the total pattern of a culture, it fades off in its various ramifications into other aspects of belief and practice.

The first step lay in describing the institutions of production. This entailed a preliminary knowledge of what an institution is. As here used an institution implies a group of people carrying on organized productive activities, with a set of tools, with a knowledge of processes, with given resources, at a given place and time, and controlled throughout by rules, sanctions, and values. This very wide description of an institution--such as that connected with a fishing activity--brings in all the relevant factors and is in essence what is implied in functional correlation. To begin with, the group which carried on collective economic activities, in Tlingit culture, turned out upon analysis to be the house-group. This group was fully described in a previous chapter on social organization so that under production it was necessary only to identify the group by its descriptive term. Practically all the principal economic activities which demanded collective co-operation were carried out by this group. The technological processes and the tools employed were given their proper place in the description of such economic activities as fishing, hunting, house building, and the handicrafts. When magical practices or taboos were encountered, they were described as part of the process. But economic production was not all collectively carried on. Many activities, such as the handicrafts, were individually carried on, the products being later shared by the house-group or exchanged with other house-groups. Co-operation, therefore, involved collective effort organized on the basis of a division of labor. This division of labor was of two kinds, that brought about by specialized knowledge, as wood carving and tool making; and that involved in organizing a joint activity, like hunting or large scale fishing. In these extensive activities there was usually a leader or organizer and men who performed particular parts of the enterprise. In deer hunting, for instance, there would be signallers, beaters, spearmen, and meat carriers.

So much for the descriptive and correlative side of our study of production. It now remains to be seen how we can reduce these activities to more fundamental principles. Take, for instance, the house-group as the central unit of co-operation. On the one hand, it correlates with the kinship system. It was expected that brothers and nephews help one another economically. Yet, on the other hand, the size and internal structure of the

Tlingit house-group correlates with the necessities involved in production as a technological process. The house-group was an extended family, and it was also the basic unit of economic co-operation because of certain physical necessities. Due to the sharply seasonal nature of food getting, nothing could be left to chance. In two or three months, the year's fish supply had to be caught, dried, and stored away. The house had to be strongly made and this involved much labor. Trading expeditions demanded large scale co-operation. The difficulties in the way of the simple family meeting all these obstacles were very great. Not only the needs of technical co-operation, but the risks involved in an individual search for food appear to have forced the Tlingit extended family into a solid production unit. Looking at the house-group as a unit of economic co-operation, we can see that its extent and strength in terms of interdependence are determined to a considerable degree by material conditions. Kinship terms and usages operated as integrating forces. It is interesting to note that today, in spite of the same kinship pattern, the extended family does not live together. The individual family is the basic production unit, the members of the extended family mutually supporting one another in case of sickness, economic failure, or other trouble. It must be here remembered that the extended family and the clan also provided political security and performed important ritual and ceremonial activities and that these cannot be explained in terms of economic security. The traditional form of Tlingit social organization was strongly matrilineal marked by sharp distinctions of individual rank and the ranking of clans into a dual organization. These features of social organization were reflected in the economic group by a close solidarity, the freeing of the men of highest rank from menial work, and the performance of ritual services by one side for the other. The molding effect of both the kinship organization as a whole and of technological necessity are apparent in the form of the house-group as a prime economic unit. These two principles were not incompatible in the traditional type of social structure. In more recent times conflict has arisen. Economic processes of production which have tended to take individuals away from the house-group, either temporarily or permanently, have done so against the strongest demands of convention and the demands of the heads of the house-groups. Thus while principles of social structure

tend to influence economic co-operation, material conditions also exert a powerful influence. Under static condition a balanced relation exists, but under change social structure itself generally changes or readjusts to a new situation.

The division of labor is also marked by both social and technical considerations. Men of high rank participated, in former days, only in trade and ceremonial activities. Women of high rank were given slave attendants. Division of labor through technical specialization was important. To this must be added the division of labor brought about by regional specialization. A certain amount of division of labor reduces itself to biological differences. There are certain tasks, like hunting and fishing, most easily performed by men, while tasks like cleaning fish and packing them for storage fitted the weaker powers of the women. Children also performed their share of the light tasks, such as the guarding of the fish racks and the fetching of wood and water. Variations in rank, technical knowledge, locality, sex, and physical strength all played their part in giving Tlingit production a specific form by influencing the division of labor.

The means of production among the Tlingit, as among other people, fall into two principal classes, methodological means and co-operative means. We can describe the tool system and its use as a methodological means. But there are two other means employed by man which fall into this class, namely, magical and religious practices. It appears that men invent magical forces and gods and devils and employ them to further their interests just as they invent tools and discover resources and use them. It is true that the order of efficacy is different. Magic and religion are resorted to when the technological system fails to bring about effective security. Among the Tlingit little or no magic was used in connection with fishing activities. On the whole these were not risky enterprises. Barring the event of an unusually small salmon run, which was very uncommon, fish came into the streams in vast numbers and with cyclical regularity. The equipment for catching fish was efficient, the organization of labor effective. Failure was thus uncommon and with this high degree of certainty went a secular attitude towards fish and fishing. If we contrast fishing activities with the enterprises of hunting and warfare, or the curing of sickness, we see that among the Tlingit they were more hazardous, and we also find that magic and religion

played an important part in these activities. It would be interesting to ascertain comparatively whether this is a general rule, whether the extent of magic and religion varies inversely as the effectiveness of the technological system.

The property relationships among the Tlingit correlate very closely with the social groupings. In the house-group, the house, the large canoes, fish nets, and guns were formerly jointly owned. Smaller articles and clothing were owned by individuals. Clan property consisted of ceremonial gear and crest objects. Resources, when owned, were held by local clan divisions. The connection between the form of property rights and the processes of production were close. The group which lived in a house built by combined efforts had no point in individually owning it. The head of the house held the house and ceremonial property as a trustee, but he did not own it in our sense of the word. Large canoes and expensive objects of use, like guns, were used and acquired by the group as a whole. If an individual could acquire objects, such as canoes, tools, weapons, fish, game, and wearing apparel, he owned them himself. The Tlingit had both private and common property. Capacity to acquire and use objects individually tended to make for individual property rights, just as the necessity to acquire and use objects jointly tended to make for common ownership. The ownership of resources, such as hunting grounds and fishing streams, was governed, in the first place, by the principle of scarcity. Large rivers were not subdivided by the clans. Every man had a right to fish in the common stream. The same held true of streams from which drinking water was obtained. It is only when we come to consider small tributaries and special hunting areas that we find clan rights appearing. Small rivers were, on account of their shallowness, much easier to work in with traps and other devices for catching fish. Spearing was also easier in shallow water. These small streams and pools were thus in great demand. The stronger clans usually laid claim to the tributaries of the main river nearest to the village, while the weaker clans were forced to go further afield. Thus scarcity gave rise to a definition of rights of the clans to the desirable streams. Protection is also a factor which enters into property. Tlingit who lived near foreign tribes guarded the streams against outsiders. With the appearance of new conditions these rights had to be revised. When the fur trade became important, trade routes

into the interior became of paramount importance, and, in some parts of Tlingit territory, villages, instead of clans, laid claim to these trade routes, something that went counter to the tradition of clan ownership. While, under new conditions, a village made up of a variety of clans could unite in laying claim to a common right to a trade route, it is also true that, under changed conditions, clan territory tended to separate into individual holdings. When trapping areas became of great importance to the Tlingit, the clan territory was split up into individual areas, each trapper building himself a private cabin and carrying on an individual enterprise. It seems, therefore, that the form which property takes in different systems of economy depends to a considerable degree upon certain material factors, like scarcity, technological necessity, and the need for protection. The influence of social structure must, of course, always be taken into consideration. When change takes place, it is upon the traditional pattern that the new forces infringe, causing readjustments and changes.

The Tlingit house-group was not economically self sufficient. Technical and regional specialization brought about the exchange of commodities. Before going on to discuss the various mechanisms of exchange, we must see what part the exchange of goods and services played in the acquisitive process of Tlingit economy. Although the ratio of goods acquired through individual production and exchange cannot be accurately established, we can say with a high degree of certainty that Tlingit economy was predominantly a subsistence economy in which the house-group played the leading role. Exchanges had not developed to such an extent where permanent forms of money and markets had become a necessity. Pure exchange was still essentially barter. Along with the collective mode of production and consumption went co-operative relationships making for attitudes of intimacy and mutual trust; a type of solidarity in which balanced, reciprocal relationships were the rule. When exchanges were necessary, they were strongly influenced by the relationships built up around collective co-operation. When a man wanted an object possessed by another individual, who was at the same time a kinsman, he would not make an outright request for the object, but would hint about its quality and express a desire to possess such an object. Upon departing from the house of his kinsman, he would leave a present

which he believed was equal in value to the object he desired to possess. Sometime later he would return, and if the owner of the article was satisfied he would give the desired object as a return gift. Thus within a village where most men were kinsmen individual exchanges took the gift form. Along with the effect of kinship and friendship upon exchange relationships went individual rank. A man of high rank was expected to give a return gift not equal to what he had received but commensurate with his rank. All these forces--kinship, friendship, and rank--were principles built up within a certain type of economic, political, and ceremonial co-operation. An act of economic exchange or barter among the Tlingit was essentially incompatible with the existing type of social solidarity. Barter or trade involves at the very outset contest and opposition, bargaining and haggling. The transaction may end up as a reciprocal relationship, but in the process each person endeavors to get the better of the other. The Tlingit were ever ready to cheat members of other villages and boasted of their ability to make large profits from their trade with the ignorant Athapascan tribesmen of the interior. I would suggest that the much maligned principle of economy which states that men, on the whole, endeavor to get as much as they can with a minimum of effort plays an important part not only in trade but also in productive effort. Malinowski, for example, gives much space in the attempt to prove that the economic activity of primitive man is not governed by this principle. If he means that the actions of men are not governed by this principle alone, I would agree with him. But if he intends to say that the principle of economy is not discernible in the economic behavior of primitive man, then facts can be brought to show that the principle exists. The principles of reciprocity and economy are both operative in all human relationships. Such concepts, as equilibrium, balance, fair play, and a just price can be said to be at the basis of co-operative behavior. Men unite for collective action and mutual support. But it is common knowledge that men cheat, rob, and exploit one another; that groups hold other groups in subjection; and that individuals use unfair means to overcome their rivals and competitors. This type of action is not explainable in terms of the principle of reciprocity, but rather in terms of the principle of economy. If both principles are taken into consideration, a more realistic analysis of economic behavior can be made.

Among the Tlingit economic reciprocity formed the most important aspect of exchange. First, there was the food gift by means of which surplus food was not permitted to go to waste but was left on the beach before the village so that villagers could help themselves. By this means shortages and surpluses tended to cancel one another in an economy not dependent upon a market.

The gift exchange, which has already been described, was the usual way in which individuals obtained the goods and services of other individuals. Ostensibly the principle of economy should operate here and to a degree it did, for if a man took a gift which was not sufficient to pay for the article he wanted, the article was not delivered until he had made a further gift. But as the individuals who practiced this type of exchange were also kinsmen or friends who were bound together by a number of mutual ties involving close co-operation, the full play of bargaining would weaken these important ties, and, therefore, bargaining was modified by exchange taking the gift form. In other words the demand for reciprocity was greater than the demand for economy of effort.

The feast and the ceremonial gift were also important mechanisms of exchange. Recreation, entertainment, and ritual co-operation were perhaps the purposes behind the giving of feasts and ceremonial gifts. The rights of birth, puberty, marriage, and burial were considered community affairs in which the members of the entire village participated. In these rites the strongly unilateral house-groups and clans came into interaction in a very characteristic way. Instead of losing themselves in common participation, the clans maintained their sharp distinction, performing ritual services for members of the opposite phratry. For these services they were rewarded with food and gifts. Although non-economic in purposive content, the feast and the ceremonial gift served important economic functions. The feasts provided a change of diet, for a rich variety of foods was used for this purpose. As houses vied with one another in the giving of these feasts, there was a tendency for the standard of food consumption to improve in quality and to increase in quantity. The giving of ceremonial gifts gave rise to saving and the transfer of consumable goods into durable goods and symbols of wealth. Although these goods were not, in theory, to be used for the purpose of obtaining consumable goods, but were strictly to be used for

ceremonial purposes, under stress they were so used. Thus ceremonial purposes were instrumental in building up capital surpluses, for providing that economic security without which extra-economic values develop with difficulty.

We come at last to trade proper, to the exchange of goods untrammelled by the considerations of social obligation involved in kinship, clanship, and common locality. No Tlingit would trade with a person belonging to his mother's or to his father's local clan division. Trade between distant clansmen, especially when they lived in separate villages, did sometimes take place, but even this was frowned upon. One traded with people whom one did not know intimately, with men from the interior, with strange Tlingit, with the Tsimshian and the Haida, and with white men. The object of trade was to get what one wanted and to make a good bargain. Women, the Tlingit observed, were better at bargaining than men, so large trading expeditions always took an old woman along who saw to it that a good deal was made. Cheating was resorted to. Red fox furs were, for instance, dyed black so that they could be sold for a higher price. How much of this the Indians learned from the white man is difficult to tell; in any case it fitted in well with the customary treatment which the Tlingit meted out to strangers. As trade progressed, trade relations were established which, in turn, tended to mitigate exploitation. Although not all Tlingit were regular traders, those who in historic times took trading up as a permanent occupation established, first of all, connections with certain natives in the interior and, secondly, with certain white traders or trading posts. To his trading partner in the interior, a Tlingit would, every spring when the mountain passes had opened, take a supply of powder and shot, guns, blankets, tinware, beads, fish oil, and dried salmon. In return he would get the furs which his trading partner had trapped or had collected from other natives. While bargaining was still the foundation upon which the making of a deal depended, other factors entered. A Tlingit trader learned that he could "kill the goose that laid the golden egg"; that the exploitation of interior natives led to the severing of trade connections just as surely as the continued cheating of white men; that trade relationships with strangers involved reciprocity, honesty, and a square deal, if the evident benefits of trade were to continue.

The old traditional type of Tlingit economy found some need for trade, but ruled barter out as an element of exchange among kinsmen. The conditions sustaining the house-group as the fundamental economic unit we have already cited, and so long as these conditions had to be faced, the collective co-operation necessary was not permitted to be endangered by the destructive force of bargaining. When, however, trade grew in importance due to the fur trade, the barter type of exchange assumed greater dimensions. Men no longer depended entirely on the house-group, but carried on trapping and trading as lucrative side lines. At first trade relations tended to be to a high degree competitive and predatory. When, however, the conditions leading to trade grew in extent and permanence, trade relations also tended to stabilize. One can almost speak here of the development of a business ethics. Yet, so long as a Tlingit depended upon the house-group for his basic economic needs, so long were trade relationships barred between its members, and the gift reigned supreme as the mechanism of exchange. Throughout the development of Tlingit production and exchange, in recent times, the two principles--of reciprocity, on the one hand, and economy, on the other--have provided the conflicting poles between which economic behavior has oscillated. In every case material conditions whether of geography, climate, resources, technology, or the appearance of the fur traders provided the objective situation which stressed the dominance of the one or the other of these principles.

We come, lastly, to consumption, the final point in the cycle of economic production. Here, again, we must deal with the mechanisms of consumption and endeavor to see how they are governed by the social milieu and how they relate to economic conditions. One of the primary uses of wealth everywhere is the provision it makes for the dietary pattern. In most primitive communities this dietary pattern is not very extensive or varied and, on the whole, tends to be fixed both in quality and quantity by well recognized conventions and taboos. The same applies to the clothing and housing standards. Customarily an economist speaks of consumption as being determined by the standard of consumption. Upon analysis this standard breaks down into principle and subsidiary requisites. Among the Tlingit the salmon formed the principal food with which fish, whale, and seal oil were included as relishes. The Tlingit called the salmon food proper, while other

articles of the diet, as oil, edible roots, berries, and herbs were given distinct names and classed as relishes. The meat of deer, black bear, mountain goat, and such birds as ducks, geese, and partridges was also classed as food proper. Fish and meat, therefore, formed the basis of the food pattern or standard around which other consumable articles entered. A Tlingit would not object to going without some of his relishes, but if he did not get his fish or his meat, he would complain of hard times.

The standard of clothing demanded buckskin trousers, a shirt, and moccasins; a cedar bark hat in summer and a fur cap and a fur cloak for winter use. Similarly, the standard of housing called for a well built, well roofed plank dwelling with a fireplace in the center and a smoke hole in the roof. Houses varied in size and adornment only.

Taking the standard of consumption as a starting point, we can use it to explain why natives do not tend to adopt new forms of foods, or do so very slowly and reluctantly; and why they often quite readily adopt certain foreign articles and just as readily reject others. Looking at any consumption standard as an integrated pattern, we can say that it is a gestalt constructed around certain well-defined norms or principles, and that it has selective capacity.

This type of approach to the study of consumption patterns ignores a number of vital questions. It makes of the pattern a somewhat mystical entity and assumes an a priori existence. To the investigator it is the very existence of the pattern which calls for explanation. Secondly, the selective capacity is not a mysterious, automatic process but a dynamic, realistic readjustment. Finally, it tends to ignore the fact that consumption patterns are historical products and that they often break down very suddenly. That the Tlingit built their consumption pattern around fish and game of a special kind is roughly explained in the same way that we would explain the consumption pattern of the Plains Indians which centered about buffalo meat. With the acquisition of the horse and the muzzle loading gun, the Plains Indian was able to move out onto the open prairie and to depend principally upon the meat of the buffalo because then he could control that source of food supply with more ease and certainty than had been possible before the advent of the horse and gun. Although we do not know how the Tlingit came to use the salmon as their principal

source of food product, we are able to see that the potential food supply was there and that they had developed the tools to command this food supply. The environmental, technological approach is always a valuable start. Next as to the rejection and adoption of new commodities. For a long time the Tlingit refused to adopt the use of various kinds of cereals. The change from a dependence upon meat proteins to cereal proteins meant a radical change in their economy. The dependence upon meat and fish was well worked out in the traditional economy and, until the opportunity for depending upon cereals came with equal certainty, the Tlingit held to fish and meat. The change over came about first by the restriction of the fish supply by white encroachment; and, secondly, through the opportunity for the Tlingit to acquire white man's food at nearby settlements. The dependence upon white man's food became more certain than dependence upon fish. The efforts of missionaries and government schools speeded up this process. While the adoption of the principal American foods came slowly, the Tlingit from early times were eager to obtain liquor, tobacco, and candy. These articles made a direct appeal to the tastes of the natives, but did not interfere with the basic processes of their economy.

Among the Tlingit, wealth served other ends than the satisfaction of needs for food, shelter, clothing, and the upkeep of capital equipment. The Tlingit were an artistic people. Much time and energy was spent in the carving of totem poles and the making of ceremonial objects. Experts, while busy on these tasks, had to be supported from accumulated food supplies or by being given presents if they were not members of the house-group for which they were working. The totem poles, Chilcat blankets, and other artistic products of the Tlingit formed, as a whole, a considerable body of wealth which, in early times, was not transferable but existed as permanent acquisitions to the various clans.

Other uses of wealth were payments made in the settlement of marriages and legal disputes. In order to get a wife, a man with the help of his house-group had to accumulate a considerable amount of wealth which was handed over to the bride's father. Instead of always demanding blood revenge for murder, the Tlingit quite often settled such disputes with the payment of indemnities, the rule for such payments being based on the calculation that every man was worth the bride price of his mother. The use of

wealth in making these payments differed from the use of wealth in payment for art objects, in so far as wealth used for social payments amounted to a transfer of ownership rather than a concentration of wealth in a number of uneconomic symbols.

By far the most important social avenue of wealth consumption was the potlatch which, in historic times, became the characteristic enterprise in Tlingit social life. In essence the potlatch is a ceremonial gift exchange connected with the ritual of the life cycle. Events, such as birth, puberty, marriage, and death, were used by the Tlingit, in common with many other primitive peoples, as occasions for general social gatherings. While necessary social functions were carried out during these gatherings, feasting, dancing, and speech making also played important parts. The specific manner in which the ritual services were carried out was determined to a considerable extent by the social organization. In the section on social organization it has been pointed out that the Tlingit were divided into two great intermarrying phratries. The members of these two phratries in the various villages came together principally on ritual occasions. There was no defined economic co-operation between them. Through cross-cousin marriage, house-groups in the two phratries became linked; at ritual gatherings the people of one of these house-groups would perform services for the other. While clans from both phratries came together at these gatherings for ritual and recreation, the strong clan relationships were not permitted to grow lax but were given expression through public competitions in theatricals, and speeches in which the respective merits of the clans were emphasized. The giver of the potlatch would at the end of the ritual reward those of his opposites for performing services and also give gifts to every member of the opposite phratry present. Having a dual organization and strongly marked clans, these ritual gatherings were at once integrative through the exchange of gifts, yet competitive, in so far as each clan vied with the other in an effort to be more important either by putting on the best dance or by giving the largest gifts.

The development of the potlatch, especially as to the gift exchange, depended largely upon leisure and wealth. The Tlingit claimed that long ago the potlatches were small affairs, the gifts not being very great in value, and that they were always connected with the ritual of the life cycle. The importance

given to these ritual performances was heightened by the fact that the Tlingit had sufficient leisure in which to give every phase due consideration. Potlatches lasted, from the ritual standpoint, for four days, according to the old tradition, but feasting and dancing could go on much longer. Potlatches were held chiefly in the winter time when little work could be carried on. Much time was given to the preparation of the ceremonial material, such as robes, masks, rattles, and in decorating the interior of the house with mats and totem carvings. The dances connected with the totem animals were carefully prepared beforehand. Special speech makers and dancers were hired to outdo rivals. This high development could only have taken place in a community in which everyone had sufficient leisure, or in which ceremonialism had become the prerogative of a clearly differentiated class.

With the appearance of the fur trade, wealth suddenly increased, without interfering with the leisure necessary for potlatching. In fact, the fur trade brought about a division in the economy of the Tlingit. During the summer and autumn the Tlingit were busy preparing the food necessary for the winter and spring. Early in the spring they traded and trapped in the interior for the furs which they later sold to the white fur traders. Thus, on the one hand, the Tlingit maintained their traditional economy based on the house-group and upon which their economic security depended, while, on the other, they were able to take part in a highly lucrative fur trade which enabled them to amass large quantities of blankets and trade goods which they could not use for direct economic purposes. Moreover, this increase was sudden. Even if, eventually, the population would have increased to offset increased wealth, at that time epidemics of smallpox and the spread of venereal disease diminished the population. This tended to make the Tlingit even more wealthy. Thus, having leisure, a great increase in wealth which they could not readily consume, and a pattern of ceremonial gift giving, it was inevitable that the potlatch should develop along independent lines. It became dissociated from the ritual of the life cycle; or rather two types of potlatch appeared--one ritual and the other secular.

The potlatch, as it appeared in historic times, was a specialized development and connected with the basic economy in

a peculiar way. Out of the store of so-called economic goods, such as furs which they trapped or obtained through trade, the Tlingit acquired from the white traders blankets, money, and other trade goods. With these they bought slaves and copper for the making of copper shields. These goods, namely, slaves, coppers, blankets, and money, were potlatch goods and were not usually used for other purposes than for making ceremonial payments. With the potlatch goods the Tlingit gave value to the totemic crests which, in turn, gave value and rank to the giver of the potlatch and to his clan.

In this conclusion I have endeavored to outline my approach to the study of the economic life of the Tlingit and to discuss some of the implications which the study of a primitive economy entails. Every economic system, it seems to me, carries out certain vital functions which involve (1) co-operation on the part of individuals in the use of tools and the carrying out of productive processes, (2) the definition of the roles which different members are to perform (there will be leadership and a division of labor), (3) a definition of property rights, (4) a provision for some kind of social insurance provided by the producing and consuming groups, or by kinship, or by associations other than those based on kinship, or provided directly through saving, and (5) protection or political insurance--some system of relationships which insures the security of individuals or groups in performance of their every-day tasks.

